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KENNETH L. LASOEN
Belgian Intelligence SIGINT Operations
Signals intelligence occupies a special place in spying lore, and its “very
secretive business”1 has an extra sinister dimension when considering the
massive scale on which data are being captured by the big players in the field.
Communications intercepts are deemed among the most revealing and
authoritative sources of information on projects and policies, yielding
“extremely gratifying results.”2 The embrace of this military intelligence
practice by the civilian security services as well as by commercial enterprises,
and propelled by sweeping technological advancement, has given rise to
genuine concerns about the potential all-pervasiveness of surveillance. In light
of the information leaks of the last decade and the revelations they contain,
Patrick Keefe likely understated the case in claiming that the U.S. National
Security Agency (NSA) “had revealed an institutional tendency to overreach
in its duties.”3
Technical surveillance is thus often perceived as involving the attention
of an unusual and definitely unwelcome kind of predator. Yet, a range of
predators can benefit from widespread public distrust of the powers of the
national security services, especially if that wariness restrains them from
interfering with harmful activities.4 Some elements of civil society, either
out of genuine suspicion, malevolence, or sheer naivete, see only the threat
emanating from their own government’s powers while remaining blind to
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forces that potentially pose a far greater existential threat to their freedom.
Unregulated institutional overreach fuels that mistrust. That is why
asking questions about surveillance is important to generating better
understanding and gaining an appreciation of a context which “serves to
avoid deterministic and non-empirical suppositions about the implications
of technology.”5
The need for context is even greater considering that the United States and
the United Kingdom (UK) have spied as much on their own populations as
they have collaborated with other nations, leading to wonder whether the
desire for dragnet surveillance is a common pathology among intelligence
services, and if all of them are given such a free rein. A look elsewhere is
therefore warranted. Belgium, an age-old British and American ally, boasts
quite modest intelligence capabilities while at the same time having its own
very long intelligence tradition. Facts and figures about the surveillance
operations of Belgium’s two intelligence services are presented here in the
context of their historical background.
The reports of the Belgian Standing Intelligence Agencies Review
Committee, since 1994 Parliament’s intelligence services watchdog, provide
plenty of numbers and material to offer a unique insight into the country’s
surveillance practices and accountability. They also allow an examination
that puts into context the use of surveillance in a European democracy,
where the demands posed by legal limitations and strict oversight seek to
minimize the impact that intrusive capabilities can have on privacy and
civil liberties.6
BACKGROUND
Founded on liberal values, with the utmost respect for essential freedoms, the
Belgian state has long had a deep mistrust of centralized power, military
authority, and anything to do with secret police. Paradoxically, the state long
ago did establish an institution for domestic security to guard against
subversion and espionage which operated without a legal framework for a
period of 168 years.7 Thus, the Belgian intelligence services and police have
long used intrusive techniques in carrying out their tasks. The domestic
security service, Veiligheid van de Staat—Su^rete de l’Etat (VSSE), the State
Security, is certainly no stranger to surveillance, having been around since
Belgium’s independence in 1830. The military intelligence service, Algemene
Dienst Inlichtingen en Veiligheid—Service General du Renseignement et de la
Securite (ADIV/SGRS), the General Intelligence and Security Service of the
Armed Forces, was founded during the First World War in 1915, when all
fighting armies discovered the art of wiretapping and intercepting radio
communications.8
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Because “any government bureaucracy allowed freedom from political
control is likely to exercise that freedom,”9 both the intelligence and police
services have experienced numerous scandals involving creative and
questionable techniques.10 Yet, not until the culmination of a wave of
violence coupled with skeletons tumbling out of various closets in the first
half of the 1980s did policymakers finally resolve to enshrine the functioning
of the country’s intelligence and police services in a legal framework with
parliamentary oversight. In preparing what was to become the Intelligence
Services Act of 1998 comprehensive legal determinations for justifiable
intercepts were lacking. The domestic security service, VSSE, was forbidden
by strict privacy legislation from resorting to eavesdropping. The military
intelligence service, ADIV, performed signals intelligence (SIGINT) operations
as part of its mission to provide security for the Army’s military operations,
but this too was not made explicit by law until 2003.11 As a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) member Belgium must comply with the alliance’s
standards12 and is involved in such frameworks as the NATO Advisory
Committee for Special Intelligence. Belgium also enjoys third party status vis-
a-vis the American NSA, as became apparent from the Edward Snowden
leaks. Part of the “Fourteen Eyes” alliance as one of the SIGINT Seniors
Europe (SSEUR), Belgian military intelligence contributes to and benefits
from the databases of the Signals Intelligence Data System (NATO’s
SYGDASIS) and is engaged in “Focused Cooperation” within the NSA’s
Computer Network Operations.13 The NSA and ADIV enjoy very cordial
relations. International collaboration is valued as extremely important, and a
substantial part of the resulting output is sourced by shared information.14
Despite the mention of Belgium in several Snowden collection documents,
however, Belgium’s participation in the SSEUR has not yet been officially
acknowledged, and all mentions of SIGINT cooperation agreements are
rather constrained. No explicit or formal political cover or policy for
alliances of this kind exists, as indifferent political leaders have neglected to
track, or have been kept out of, intelligence liaison arrangements until
recently. They have also failed to provide instructions regarding the security
services’ relations with foreign partners.15
The utter sensitivity of the matter has a great impact on this less-than-
transparent attitude. Sensitivity also impeded progress on preparations for
the Intelligence Services Act. Considerable public opposition developed to the
idea of granting intrusive powers to the forces of public order that were
discredited by the scandals of the 1980s. From time to time, accusations were
leveled at the services of illegally tapping the communications of politicians,
diplomats, even judicial authorities. Though easily dispelled, these allegations
were representative of the deep mistrust of the media and politicians towards
anything having to do with intelligence.16 Because of their difficult
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relationship with society and privacy, the decision was to deal with the more
pervasive intelligence methods in a separate law rather than encompass their
legal provisions in the Intelligence Services Act.17 When the Act was voted on
in 1998 it provided for only intelligence collection through human sources
(HUMINT), and surveillance in the public space.18 The laborious process of
pushing this bill through Parliament made the idea of starting work on an
even more controversial draft not enticing. Soon the measure drifted into
oblivion as reforming the police and judicial system became a more
pressing—and no less titanic—undertaking after the escape of the notorious
sex offender Marc Dutroux completely shattered what little confidence was
left in the efficiency of Belgian law enforcement.19
The intelligence services reportedly welcomed operating in a legal
framework, even if compliance meant muddling through with limited
capabilities. But, as the information revolution expanded, the lack of more
pervasive methods impacted their effectiveness, particularly that of the civil
security service. The VSSE had always enjoyed a solid reputation among the
international intelligence community with regards to counterterrorism, yet
the agency gradually found itself entirely dependent on input from foreign
kindred services in certain terrorism cases.20 Conversely, requests from allies
regarding the identification of phone numbers, e-mail addresses, IP addresses,
or the like, embarrassed the VSSE. In the intelligence world, where the quid
pro quo is the lifeblood of a relationship with friends and allies, this situation
could be detrimental for the position of a small service.21 It would also
encourage foreign agencies to independently conduct operations outside the
knowledge of the Belgian services. Nevertheless, in the interest of friendship
and diplomacy, the Belgians were notified of most activities, and indeed
became involved with them—a case in point being a terrorism case in 2001
which relied upon wiretapping by Dutch intelligence.22 The VSSE also sent
representatives to the International Law Enforcement Telecommunications
Seminar (ILETS), the forum founded by the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to facilitate international cooperation regarding
eavesdropping.23
The Standing Review Committee wholeheartedly agreed with the service
chiefs’ complaints about how the intelligence gap diminished the effectiveness
and status of the Belgian services at home and abroad. The Islamist attacks
upon the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11) spurred Belgium’s
Justice and Defence ministers to draft a bill enabling the country’s
intelligence services to intercept communications. But, despite the lack of
objections by the advisory bodies and unanimous approval by the Senate, the
proposal was never brought to a vote in the Chamber of Representatives.
Instead, such powers were eventually granted to the police.24 Police
surveillance techniques were the subject of several confidential circulars by
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the Justice Minister, the provisions of which had little standing in a court of
law.25 The Special Investigation Methods Act of 2003 statutorily placed the
police in a dominant information position.26 Now legally able to conduct
technical surveillance, the police had an obvious advantage over the
intelligence services. Especially in counterterrorism, which featured so much
overlap between law enforcement and intelligence, the police became
responsible for the lion’s share of counterterrorism successes. This greatly
aggravated the age-old rivalry between the police and intelligence services.
The VSSE particularly resented having to give up its place at the forefront of
the fight against terrorism.27 But in other areas as well, the weakness of the
services was clearly demonstrated by their lack of power in either detecting or
countering interceptions by foreign forces.28 The inability of the VSSE to use
technical means for intelligence collection caused it to focus on its age-old
forte: human intelligence (HUMINT).29 Finding an operational backdoor
through its competence in gathering intelligence through human sources, the
service recruited informants within the ranks of telecom operators and used
them to identify phone numbers, IP addresses, caller data, and information
about electronic communications that was officially unattainable. This
happened without the knowledge of the VSSE’s political masters. When this
story broke in the press, parliamentary questions about the matter were met
with answers as lengthy as they were evasive.30
After the bombings in Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 the European
nations agreed upon a more dedicated effort towards combating terrorism. In
the minds of some policymakers the notion finally dawned that the
intelligence services were unable to adequately fulfil their missions with the
means at their disposal.31 Finally, in late 2006 work began on what was to
become the Special Intelligence Methods Act. It had to overcome many
political and legal privacy barriers before receiving royal approbation in
February 2010.32
USING ‘‘SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE METHODS”
The Special Intelligence Methods Act, known in Belgium as “the BIM law,”
after its name Wet op de Bijzondere Inlichtingen Methoden, adds specific and
exceptional methods to those powers already allowed by the 1998 Act.33 The
“specific” means include technical surveillance in public places, access to
metadata or outside databases, access to identification and localization data,
and enlisting the help of operators. “Exceptional” means allow surveillance in
and searches of private places, undercover operations, intercepting mail,
collecting banking data, establishing storefronts, hacking into computer
systems, and intercepting communications. The law does not distinguish
between wireless and cable communications, and allows for different ways to
execute the intercepts, whether directly or through a service provider. These
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new capabilities, a virtual revolution in intelligence affairs in Belgium, finally
brought the two services closer to an equal footing with their foreign
colleagues.34
Although now encompassing the full spectrum of intelligence collection,
this did not mean the services could make unbridled use of the techniques
involved. The provisions of the law focus utmost attention on fundamental
rights and civil liberties, and seek to mitigate the reversal of the burden of
proof and the presumption of innocence, two of the most negative effects of
surveillance on rule of law principles.35 As methods become more intrusive,
they are tightly circumscribed and subjected to increasingly stringent
formalities and external control. The test of proportionality36 is the crux of
this supervision, whereby convincing arguments must be made that the
means employed are commensurate to the threat, and that less intrusive
means would be insufficient to adequately address it. The methods are
limited in time, scope, and coverage. They may be employed only on Belgian
territory—meaning that the intercept can happen only when the signals are in
Belgium. They must have a particular signature-based37 aim—as opposed to
allowing the services to randomly intercept anything—and fall within the
legally defined missions in the intelligence services’ portfolio for which the
methods may be brought into play. Their use must be for a reasonable
amount of time, limited to two months, with extensions possible only if
warranted by special circumstances.38
The law came into effect on 1 September 2010, by which time both services
had undertaken extensive preparations in terms of personnel, and logistical,
administrative, and financial reorganization to meet the new working
situation. Interception capabilities could not be installed overnight. Instead,
the central listening post of the federal police, the Central Communications
Interception Facility, was used. Telecom operators could also be
requisitioned for technical assistance, at predetermined tariffs.39
Table 1 provides an overview of the authorizations for the use of special
methods by the VSSE. In 2010 the methods were used for only the last four
months of that year, and in anticipation of an additional supervising body to
grant prior approval, exceptional methods were not employed. Some
different warrants pertained in fact to the same case: for example, over a two-
year period one target was the object of 18 methods, another of 47, yet
another of 79.40 Also, as the years progressed some incidents were extensions
of already initiated surveillance operations. The numbers therefore do not
represent individual investigations. Nor were the methods always
effectively employed.
Over the years, specific methods fluctuate slightly, but they have steadily
increased. For the most part, the VSSE has needed to identify phone numbers
and localize users. Exceptional methods evolved in this continuous rise in
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operations, mainly in eavesdropping. Usually, one permission entails multiple
phone numbers: for instance, the 355 permissions granted in 2011 applied to
1892 numbers.41 The significant rise in the number of identifications in 2013
compared to earlier years is explained through the use of a different counting
method by the oversight body. Identification was often part of permissions
for call data or localizations; the Committee eventually differentiated among
the three methods in 2013, which did not mean the number of identifications
had effectively risen that much,42 until they did between 2015 and 2016, due
mainly to the heightened terrorism situation.43 The more intrusive exceptional
methods are being used significantly less than the specific means. In fact,
setting up a storefront for surveillance operations has never been done, partly
because the procedure was deemed too cumbersome44—which is why this
method was not included in Table 1.
The interventions must be considered relative to the threats against which
they have been directed. Figures are made available per service, allowing for
their graphic representation (see Figure 1). The Standing Committee seldom
reveals when the ADIV or the VSSE is using the methods mentioned in its
accountability review. Though this makes a discussion per service difficult, it
is nonetheless important because the missions and priorities diverge, as do the
numbers. But occasionally, a tiny bit of context is revealed.
The first officially sanctioned eavesdrop executed by the VSSE in early
2011 immediately exposed a Belgian diplomat who had been spying for
Russian intelligence for years.45 Espionage is among the threats against
which the intrusive methods can be employed. According to the VSSE’s legal
remit,46 terrorism and the radicalization process, extremism, weapons
proliferation, harmful sects, undue interference, and organized crime are the
other threats against which the service can act by means of special methods.
Table 1. Surveillance and SIGINT Operations: State Security VSSE
Methods 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Specific methods
Technical observation 18 89 75 109 86 86 125
Technical searches — — 1 — — — —
Postal traffic — 4 2 — — — —
Identification data 15 355 254 613 554 663 215
Call data 30 237 147 136 88 33 622
Localization data 6 46 176 244 248 361 596
Total 69 731 655 1,102 976 1,143 1,558
Exceptional methods
Surveillance in private place — 2 8 6 9 6 7
Searches in private place — 3 6 6 21 8 18
Opening mail — 4 12 6 18 5 8
Banking data — 10 16 11 8 6 6
IT-system penetration — 3 10 12 18 16 27
Communications intercepts — 11 50 81 86 87 123
Total — 33 102 122 156 128 189
Grand total 69 762 757 1,124 1,132 1,271 1,747
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But exceptional methods may not be used to deal with extremism or
interference, although the justification for excluding these not unsubstantial
threats has been found lacking.47
The nature of a threat determines the national interest category and the
appropriate security service to which it is by law assigned. In the years for
which numbers are available, the VSSE employed special methods in 51.7
percent of cases involving the internal security of the state and protecting
democracy, 47.6 percent in the interest of Belgian external security and
foreign relations, and 0.7 percent for safeguarding the country’s economic
and scientific potential.
Unsurprisingly, the VSSE’s priorities lie with counterterrorism and
counterespionage. This is classic intelligence work, accounting for the
overwhelming number of methods used to monitor suspects of terrorism or
their accomplices. The dramatic rise, with over 300 authorizations between
2014 and 2015, reflects the threat of the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) which was
tragically confirmed in 2015–2016, and which then led to the increased usage
of BIM-methods.48 The high number of foreign fighters, and the Belgian
connection to the fatal attacks in Paris, painfully laid bare the reality of a
fertile breeding ground for radicalization in Belgium. Monitoring who visits
and feeds Internet websites while encouraging jihad is therefore an important
Figure 1. VSSE intercepts.
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part of trying to fight the radicalization process.49 But, to assume that all
these methods are directed against Islamic extremism and terrorism would be
incorrect, as the VSSE has both left- and right-wing extremist activities on its
radar. Still, 60 percent of the service’s methods used between June and
October 2015 pertained to the issue of foreign fighters.50
In addition to routine political espionage, clandestine activity by foreign
intelligence agents can involve the undue interference in various policy or
business domains, such as their presence at meetings about regime change or
other important matters in another country.51 Attempts at recruitment52 or
the possible sale of secret information to a foreign intelligence service53 are
also objects of technical intelligence monitoring. Economic espionage in a
knowledge-based economy has led to the protection of economic and
scientific potential as a separate intelligence interest that involves mainly
military–industrial and economic espionage that targets cutting-edge
technology companies. Belgium now has international commitments in
countering the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
This mission accounts for the highest utilization among the four types of
threats for which special methods are otherwise used. These intercepts deal
with attempts to acquire, from or via Belgium, sophisticated technology or
materials for creating weapons of mass destruction, and often involve
monitoring persons from countries suspected of such activities during their
visits to—and relationships with—political, academic, or commercial
individuals in the technology sector.54
Although these threats are closely intertwined, the huge discrepancies in
the methods used to combat them partly represent the inevitable trade-offs
required when so many pressing priorities clamor for attention, for example,
proliferation arguably being a greater existential threat55 than terrorism.
An intricate aspect is the involvement of foreign intelligence services.
Numerous BIM-methods are activated subsequent to requests from foreign
intelligence services as part of their investigations.56 Employing the special
methods for foreign collaboration is allowed insofar they are directed against
threats that jeopardize Belgium’s fundamental interests or its relations with a
friendly nation or international institution.57 While foreign intelligence
officers often participate in the use of special methods, especially providing
technical assistance, Belgian intelligence officers are in charge at all times.58
How far-reaching this cooperation can be is demonstrated by a 2015 case in
which a foreign intelligence service requested permission for the placement of
eavesdropping equipment and processing the derived information itself,
before sharing the intelligence with the Belgian service.59 While these
examples fall perfectly within the long collaborative tradition of Belgian
intelligence with foreign counterparts, they also prove that foreign services
respect the Belgians enough not to go it alone in their backyard. Some, if not
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most, of these joint investigations pertain to terrorism, with counter-
proliferation also the object of much correspondence with foreign services.60
To compare the VSSE’s numbers with those of its military counterpart
would be wrong. The remit and missions of the two services differ too much
for most comparisons to be meaningful, despite some apparent common
traits. The ADIV has other interests to protect: the inviolability of Belgian
territory, the protection of defense plans and their scientific potential for
defense purposes, securing military operations abroad, including force
protection, and protecting military secrets. The special methods used
regarding these missions are predominantly for intelligence: 76.8 percent of
the cited total over six years, with 6.7 percent in the interest of military
security, and 16.5 percent to protect military secrets. Given the different
nature of the ADIV missions, their numbers are much smaller, as shown in
Table 2.
The numbers for the ADIV fluctuate downward after peaking in 2013,
especially regarding identifications and localizations. The ADIV focused
mostly on identifications until 2016, when authorizations for localizations
and call data approximately doubled and tripled. Even then, the exceptional
methods are employed only about half as much as the specific methods, with
wiretapping in the majority and the most intrusive techniques at an absolute
minimum. The ADIV also provides numbers which relate usage of the special
methods to the threat landscape, as depicted in Figure 2.
The ADIV’s main area of concern is espionage, with terrorism and
extremism trailing. This is obvious, given the high ratio of military secrets in
Belgium, the host nation of both the civilian and military headquarters of
NATO. The special methods are directed against terrorism and extremism
when the security of military bases and personnel is at stake, from threats
Table 2. Surveillance and SIGINT Operations: General Intelligence and Security Service ADIV
Methods 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Specific methods
Technical observation 14 7 8 14 7 4 2
Technical searches — — — — — — —
Postal traffic — — — — — — —
Identification data 8 23 25 66 67 55 12
Call data 7 17 30 15 12 12 42
Localization data 7 13 4 36 28 16 32
Total 36 60 67 131 114 87 88
Exceptional methods
Surveillance in private place — — 1 1 1 3 1
Searches in private place — — — — 1 — —
Opening mail — — — — — — 1
Banking data — 5 7 5 5 3 11
IT-system penetration — — 2 — 3 3 4
Communications intercepts — 2 14 17 26 25 16
Total — 7 24 23 36 34 33
Grand total 36 67 91 154 150 121 121
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both within and without. A 2013 case involved identifying someone who was
in regular contact with an extremist anti-NATO organization, but monitoring
extremism within Army ranks is equally important.61
The ADIV also conducts purely military SIGINT operations. These
activities fall not only within its mission to preserve the general security of the
Belgian Army, but also in the context of interventions abroad in assisting
multinational peacekeeping and stability operations. SIGINT takes a
prominent place in the ADIV’s intelligence planning. Its investments in
equipment are important enough to be mentioned in the Defence Ministry’s
policy notes.62 The service has listening posts on Belgian soil to intercept
radio waves and a mobile SIGINT unit. Intercepts are mainly situated in the
SIGINT subcomponents of communications intelligence and electronics
intelligence, as well as in capturing metadata.63 Legally, the ADIV must
annually submit to the Minister of Defence for approval an “Eavesdrop
Plan”: a list of targets whose communications or electromagnetic emissions
(signatures) the service would try to intercept in the coming year. The ADIV
has to keep in a logbook a record of interceptions and progress for review by
the Standing Committee. Rather passive in nature, and not allowing for the
fluidity of the targeted communications, the procedure has posed many legal
and practical difficulties for planning, direction, and exploitation, as the
Figure 2. ADIV intercepts.
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interception process naturally generates intelligence outside the scope of the
targeted signatures.64 This was partly remediated in 2010, with advance legal
authorization to probe the ether.65 Accountability has been facilitated by a
clear outline of the processes involved.66
The SIGINT discipline also requires continuous training and adaptation,
facing as it does constant change and frequent revolutions, which quickly
cause stasis if too much emphasis is placed on a particular technique.67 Rapid
changes in technology and capabilities are hard to reconcile with the legal
framework, such as determination of territoriality, even if the ADIV defines
its collection goals as broadly as possible in the Eavesdrop Plan.
Nevertheless, since it began screening these intercepts the Standing
Committee has never had to order a termination.68
Belgium’s participation to the International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan also involves a contribution to ISAF’s Afghanistan
SIGINT Coalition (AFSC), although the AFSC and its datacentre for
intelligence exchange, codenamed CENTER ICE, are not officially
mentioned. BELINT, the name of the cell responsible for intelligence, acts as
a sensor intercepting metadata, but retains operational tasking authority
apart from the international command.69 Belgium’s armed forces are present
in various other theaters around the world,70 with the ADIV involved as a
security provider. BIM-methods cannot be used outside Belgian territory, not
in this context, making it difficult to comply with coalition partner requests.71
The SIGINT alliances, which include the Belgian service participating mainly
on the basis of a memorandum of understanding, are varied in their scope of
collection and the availability of the intercepts to participants. These
potentially enable the ADIV to operate in a legal vacuum, as far as its ability
to do so under Belgian law.72 For that reason, democratic oversight must be
as pervasive as the surveillance itself.
THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF USING INTRUSIVE TECHNIQUES
As far as BIM-methods go, a number of checks are in place to ensure strict
adherence to the law. Accountability occurs at the level of the service chiefs
and two supervisory bodies. Specific means must first be approved by the
head of the service. On a monthly basis the intelligence services must submit
a list of these authorizations to be checked for compliance with the law. In
addition to the Standing Committee, conducting its supervision during and
afterwards with a standard procedure and detailed checklist, a commission of
specialized magistrates, the BIM-Commission, exercises control over the
proceedings and can shut them down at any time and forbid the exploitation
of the collected data, which must then be destroyed immediately. Exceptional
methods have an additional check: because the BIM-Commission has to
approve them a priori, requests have to be approved unanimously once the
12 KENNETH L. LASOEN
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
Commission is satisfied that all legal requirements have been met.73 The
intelligence chief must then monitor the use of the method closely and
suspend it if necessary. The Standing Committee can order a stop to the use
of a method if legal requirements are violated. The BIM-Commission can
also suspend permission, although the Committee I can overrule its
judgement and (partly) reinstate it.74 The BIM-Commission also arbitrates in
case of overlap with a potential criminal investigation, deciding whether the
intelligence services or the judicial authorities can continue surveillance.75 An
a posteriori legality check by the Standing Committee of the result of the
collection against the authorization concludes the cycle of supervision.
By their very nature the use of exceptional methods happens only in
exceptional circumstances. Therefore, potential time constraints are impacted
by the a priori requirement and approval thereof by the BIM-Commission. If
the Commission fails to respond within the legally determined four days the
request is transferred to the responsible government minister who can opt to
grant authorization.76 When time is absolutely of the essence, the chairman
of the BIM-Commission can also give approval on his own, a decision which
allows use of the method for a maximum of 48hours.77 The service chief can
also verbally approve the urgent demand of call data. But this must then be
put in writing as soon as possible. Urgency is not allowed to detract from
legal form. The procedure has proven impractical, however; some matters
could be so time-sensitive that by the time the urgency procedure was seen
through, the targets had left the country again.78
By a test of proportionality the use of the methods is permissible only
when they have been demonstrated as being absolutely necessary and are, in
fact, the last resort. Requests for running this or other surveillance technique,
data retrieval, or interception have to be substantially justified by the head of
the service. These determinations must describe the context of the
investigation and the expected end result. The Standing Committee expects a
draft motivation to include the name and rank of the intelligence officers who
will execute the method, for how long, the threats and interests involved, the
legal competence of the service to act upon them, the specific character and
seriousness of the threat posed by the target, the contents and reliability of
the information that has led to the method being requested, why the
proposed methods are necessary, and where the investigation is to be placed
in terms of the overall priorities of the service, as described in the yearly plan
of action.
This was somewhat challenging for the traditionally secretive, need-to-
know services, which at first attempted to draft their intentions as succinctly
as possible.79 They were soon refuted by the supervising bodies which
proceeded to suspend authorization when they considered the motivation to
be insufficient. Motivations based on suspicions and mere hypotheses were
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not enough absent a demonstrable potential threat.80 It could also be that the
proportionality was off-balance. Often, no reasons were given or they were
defined too vaguely. Occasionally, the connection to the interests to be
protected or a definition of which threat was occurring was lacking. In one
request to allow identification of the phone numbers and e-mail addresses of
three persons, only one of them was justifiably investigated, while the reasons
for targeting the other two were unclear. In such cases additional information
from the intelligence service usually resolved the issue.81 The ADIV was
found the more lacking in this respect, while the VSSE quickly learned to be
forthcoming with greater detail.82
Many interventions by the supervising bodies concern the inevitable clash
of legal formalities with real world practice. Differences of interpretation can
occur between the supervisor, seeking maximum legal protection, and the
intelligence service, seeking means to an end. At first, the ADIV issued many
authorizations that ultimately were not executed, having requested them in
the event they would be needed. The ADIV also considered the use of BIM-
methods abroad, allowing for force protection during foreign missions.83 The
Committee I countermanded both practices. In 2011, one of the intelligence
services considered gaining knowledge of the PUK codes of some SIM cards,
a specific method for identifying the user or the device of the user, whereas
the oversight body defined such an operation as hacking into an IT-
framework, which is considered an exceptional method.84 There is no room
for liberal interpretation of the warrant, as use of the methods must adhere
strictly to the authorization as described in the request. Seeking data on a
phone number is allowed for only that particular number, not for every
number registered to the person being investigated. Occasionally, usage of the
method was partly suspended because it was applied on both a mobile phone
number and a landline linked to the target’s name, or a second mobile
phone.85 The restriction also applied to acquiring call data from family
members, when the intelligence service cannot adequately demonstrate that
the target was using the said family member’s devices.86 In 2012, a situation
arose where opinions about the application of the urgency procedure
conflicted. During an investigation, an intelligence officer saw, and took a
chance to copy, data from a hard drive, an action which was then given post
factum authorization. In itself illegal, the authorization authority appealed to
the urgency procedure, given the very short window of opportunity. The
Standing Committee, in whose view the intelligence services should have
anticipated such situations, would not countenance this.87
BIM-methods may not be directed at subjects who do not themselves
constitute a threat even if doing so could yield useful circumstantial
information.88 Committee I also expects the setting of a reasonable time
period, for both ongoing and future operations.89 And, in a few espionage
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cases, where banking data had to be requested retroactively, reasons were
given that the search should necessarily be allowed to go back farther in
time.90 Time restrictions are often problematic when extensions are needed,
especially when such requests are filed past the end time of the original.91 In
such cases the data acquired during the interval must be destroyed without
being exploited. Extensions have to be justified in greater detail than the
original authorization; to simply repeat the reasons why they have to be
expanded is not sufficient.92 In reviewing this and other aspects, the
supervising bodies take a hands-on approach to their control function,
occasionally by themselves testing whether the required information could
really be attained only by using special intelligence methods. In this way the
BIM-Commission has a few times pointed out that certain phone numbers
could simply be identified through the white pages.93 The Standing
Committee has also questioned how urgent the threat might be that justified a
hacking since the intelligence service delayed exploiting the acquired data for
more than two weeks.94
The law provides for demanding and getting the cooperation of the
country’s telecom operators for technical assistance.95 Some issues arise with
working with outside partners. In 2012, for example, the service providers
had themselves automatically included localizations with requested
identifications or call data. Administrative error has also led to faulty
intercepts: wiretapping, when only call data was requested, or wiretapping
the wrong phone number, or localization of all of the numbers in an
authorization which applied to only one of them.96 Other issues with
requisitioning outside services can occur when the intelligence agencies
become creative with their authorizations, translating them into instructions.
Permission for monitoring call data led the service in question to
inappropriately get a telecom operator to provide said data, along with all
operators to identify the callers the data yielded.97 Similarly, permission to
get hold of all phone numbers of a particular individual was extended to not
only request the same of multiple persons, but also to a demand to know all
their means of electronic communication. In one case, a request for the call
data of foreign persons in order to establish whether they had contacts in
Belgium did not mention the need to limit the data to Belgian contacts.98
Other practical issues arise when protected professions are involved.
Because its status is not as clearly defined as that of someone from the
medical or legal profession, the designation “journalist,” a popular espionage
cover, is not always so straightforward as a target. In 2011, one of the
intelligence services questioned whether a blogger was to be considered a
journalist merely because he identified himself as such on the website where
he was professing extremist opinions—the reason for its interest. Both
supervising bodies allowed applying the special means to find out whether the
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individual was actually a journalist before following the appropriate
procedure.99
Their interventions clearly indicate that both supervising bodies adopt a
very critical approach to the use of intrusive techniques, although not
without some degree of pragmatism. In principle, when authorization is
revoked the now illegally-acquired data may not be exploited and has to be
destroyed. Yet, a legally sanctioned method could somehow lead to obtaining
information by dubious means. The Standing Committee would in that case
weigh the balance between the gravity of the threat and the importance of the
information gained against the violation of administrative–technical
regularity. But the use of additional BIM-methods cannot benefit from
illegally-acquired intelligence, no matter how pertinent.100 To judge
proportionality in applying a particular technique as a preliminary to using
future methods is not always easy. This is especially the case for traffic
analysis.101 The services have from time to time wanted to identify, localize,
or eavesdrop on targets for which they initially needed the means to obtain
the numbers or electronic communications intended for targeting. They
usually seek to include everything in a single authorization, but the Standing
Committee demands instead that the services proceed stepwise.102 Earlier,
however, and because doing so was justified in great detail and proportional
to the threat, the Standing Committee allowed eavesdropping on not only all
a target’s known telephone communications, but those unknown as well, as
these could spring forth from other methods.103
Arguably, the most important and most interesting aspects of the use of
special intelligence methods are the results.104 A legitimate yet unanswered
question regarding the intrusive surveillance powers of intelligence services is
whether they actually achieve their “litany of goals.”105 In its monthly
accountability listing, the ADIV did initiate the practice of indicating
responsiveness to stated intelligence requirements.106 The Standing Committee
worked on a method of sampling how the intelligence services valued the
outcome of their use of the BIM-methods,107 publishing its findings in its 2013
activity report. It asked both services to evaluate the utility of nine percent of
the total of methods employed between September 2010 and December 2012 in
relation to the projected goals of the investigation (see Figure 3).108
Intelligence achievements are not easily quantified, as the results are often
“simply in contriving that nothing happens.”109 Intercepts rarely find their
way into final reports, thereby making a linear connection to signals
intelligence very difficult. If the sampling of the Standing Committee, having
reviewed four cases,110 is any indication, the intelligence services apparently
employ the techniques mainly to establish whether or not a threat emanates
from a person or organization, and to reconstruct their network and contacts.
Surveillance occasionally reveals nothing conclusive despite strengthened
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suspicions. In a second case reviewed by the watchdog, the use of 47
methods—mainly identifications and localizations—complemented by the
usual methods under the 1998 Act led to a satisfactory conclusion, while 79
methods did not help to clarify how threatening another subject was. The
fourth case touched upon the limitations of SIGINT and the obstacles posed
by the lack of funds and personnel to effectively process all the acquired
data,111 although what could be analyzed did generate many intelligence
reports. Evidently, the results are mixed. Three people named in connection
with the attacks in Paris of 13 November 2015 (13/11) had earlier been targets
of BIM-methods that yielded no sufficient warning indications. While special
methods were useful for the progress of the investigation into 13/11, they did
not foreshadow 22/3, and neither did the ADIV’s own or received SIGINT.112
After intercepts provided the key to rolling up a terrorist cell in early 2015
and most likely prevented an attack on Brussels in the days after Paris,113 this
result largely reflects an increased operational security. Ultimately, however,
whether in double-checking information, confirming suspicions, or
determining the absence of indications, the techniques boost the information
position of the intelligence services in concert with all-source
collection activities.
THE CHALLENGE OF TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS
To be a fly on the wall during any human interaction is arguably the greatest
enticement driving an intelligence service that is on constant lookout for
Goals attained in full Goals partly attained No goals attained
ADIV VSSE
Figure 3. Results of BIM-methods.
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potential threats and harm to the citizens it must protect. The technological
information revolution seems to have handed intelligence services the tools to
do just that. If left unchecked, however, that capability can easily derail into a
dragnet surveillance which so diverts focus from the original mission as to
become a danger in itself. The loss of focus is also manifest by the enhanced
primacy of collection. SIGINT by itself has no inherent value; its
interpretation does, and that still requires processing by the human brain and
fusion with information from other sources.114 SIGINT’s value is rarely
assessed or demonstrated publicly. The vast, almost inconceivable, amounts
of data captured and stored beg the question as to whether the ambitions of
Total Information Awareness (TIA) have in fact devolved into total
information without awareness. The smart management of surveillance115 is a
great challenge, not just to maximize intelligence value but also, and more
importantly, to guarantee democratic control. A legitimate concern for the
security services regarding surveillance is that the implied infringement of
fundamental rights is justified by the tangible results in securing society. The
little information on public record regarding this has so far fallen far short of
the mark.116 Even with respect for protecting secrets, means, and methods,
the effectiveness of SIGINT remains largely outside the scope of scrutiny.
Addressing this democratic deficit without compromising security certainly
deserves considerable thought and debate since doing so could go a long way
toward alleviating concerns and contributing to a better public understanding.
For this reason, expected results could perhaps play a more prominent part in
a surveillance impact assessment. Measuring results should not submit to the
fallacy that everything that counts can be counted; instead, the right
evaluating approach can invite reflection of effectiveness and satisfaction.117
After all, democratic nations face a constant dilemma in the effort of
protecting themselves from violating the rights they hold so dear,118 and must
provide acceptable justification in carrying out those attempts. Hence, the
need for “a conducive framework for seamless interaction between preventive
capabilities and investigative protocols.”119 When taken in total, and
accounting for the fact that many authorizations pertain to the same persons
or investigations, relatively few of Belgium’s 11.5 million population have
been targeted by intrusive security techniques. The small number of special
methods utilized shows the country to be far from the Orwellian menace of
an all-pervasive mass surveillance. The main safeguard is conducting a
bottom-line scrutiny and the primacy of subsidiarity and proportionality,
which are the outcome of the socio-political arguments against granting
intelligence services intrusive capabilities, objections that were based on a
historically embedded mistrust of the secret police.
The resulting strict oversight has also helped in setting the strategic
direction of the intelligence services. Intelligence officers have had to adapt
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to the need to contextualize and justify their requests for intrusions, while
balancing the proportionality of the suggested methods with the threat
being countered. This has invited a change in mentality and greater
attention to the responsible use of means and materiel.120 In fact, this
enforced thought process has meant that a certain amount of analysis
should precede engaging in collection, to determine whether it seems to be
worthwhile and allowed. This signifies a reversal in intelligence affairs of
the relationship between collection and analysis, when previously increased
collection capability easily devolved into a preoccupation with hoarding
information.
The early years after the law came into effect featured a process of trial
and error in which the Standing Committee had to establish a number of
precedents. The frequent informal deliberations of the parties involved have
subsequently grown into a working group which, since 2014, now discusses
jurisprudence and clarifies legal and operational procedures, best practices,
and what to do in case of duplication—as when both VSSE and ADIV
independently direct BIM-methods at the same target.121 This sustained
attention122 contributes to ensuring that authorized procedures are followed
closely, and that they are effective from the start. The decreased number of
suspensions by Committee I over the years—from almost forty initially, to
ten in 2016—and a corresponding decrease of total interventions to 0.15
percent in 2016 shows a positive evolution in the clarity of jurisprudence and
a faithful adherence to legal requirements.123
NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS
Yet, legal procedures rarely conform to the real world. The six years in which
BIM-methods have been brought into play have brought numerous burdens,
restrictions, confusion, obscurities, and unforeseen situations and
technological evolutions. The Belgian connection to the attacks of 13
November 2015 in Paris demanded immediate reflection upon the
effectiveness of the BIM-law and the rigidity of the legal framework. After
the attacks, the government in Brussels amended the country’s Intelligence
Services Act. The bill, enacted by Parliament in March 2017, seeks to address
the complexity and unpredictability of operational procedures. It allows the
ADIV to intercept all foreign communications and lifts the exclusion of using
BIM-methods outside Belgian soil, while making planning procedures more
flexible, for instance, in cable tapping. It allows the VSSE to employ
exceptional methods against undue interference and extremism. Both services
are strengthened in requisitioning service providers to counter the use by
targets of highly-encrypted Internet messaging applications. Data retention
periods are extended from one to five years. It provides an urgency procedure
for specific methods and rectifies practical issues with the procedure for
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exceptional methods. The bill adds only one new specific method to the
repertoire: the ability to demand travel data. It also provides a passive
notification to individuals that they were the object of one or more BIM-
methods, at least ten years after the case has been closed. The new law entails
some substantial extensions to the competences of military intelligence, even
including the ability to conduct offensive cyber operations against weapon
systems or enemy radar. At the same time, stricter supervision has been
added, requiring greater detail and circumscription in operational
justifications. The bill took care to prevent the ADIV from being able to
conduct mass surveillance.124 This additional leeway to conduct collection
activities abroad means the that Belgian intelligence’s legal framework has
finally caught up with the increasingly blurred distinction between the
internal and the external in security.125
A particularly delicate aspect of the internal–external nexus is international
SIGINT collaboration. The late Matthew Aid noted how smaller nations
naturally have an incentive to participate in agreements with bigger players,
and thus significantly augment their own range.126 Belgium, too, is part of
such an “extraordinary global infrastructure for listening in.”127 Yet, the final
word has not been said about what has so far been revealed through the
Snowden leaks. In just one of those documents, a collaborative platform,
“International Security Issues,” has been astonishingly used not only for
mutual benefit in providing “valuable analytic insights as well as their
technical capabilities,” but for simultaneously spying on the participants.128
Unacceptable levels of intrusion into private and public life occur, therefore,
not only by the signals intelligence operations of the country’s own services,
but by foreign states and corporate entities, friend and foe alike. Most
national jurisdictions are becoming increasingly irrelevant, and most
international law falls short in countering this phenomenon, which in and of
itself is “deeply rooted in the transgression of foreign legal rules.”129 Still,
these opaque projects should not be exempt from scrutiny simply because
they are transnational.130 In Belgium, they are not. The Standing Review
Committee has full access to the input, outtake, and information requests of
the Belgian services, and has reported on its accountability examinations.
Recently, the Committee set the requirements for participation with a
cooperative venture focusing on foreign terrorist fighters which involves
sharing personal information and metadata. In a new development, the
Belgian watchdog has conducted a review of this collaboration
simultaneously with the supervising bodies of five other participating
countries and compared results, proving that transnational projects can be
supervised transnationally.131
The Dutch counterpart of Committee I has already published its report on
this project, noting that while increased cooperation is good, it does bring
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with it numerous risks to the legitimacy of the acquired data—meaning that
the services could acquire intelligence they would be unable to collect under
their own legal remit—and its ownership and uses. This accountability deficit
is especially felt in the urge to go to the greatest lengths to get the best
intelligence for counterterrorism, which can lead to ignoring the legality
considerations. The services therefore have a shared responsibility to provide
additional safeguards beyond those enshrined in their respective legal
frameworks. National oversight on its own will then not be sufficient, and
there will be more need for multilateral oversight to maximize civil rights
protection.132
In Belgium, eavesdropping remains the exception, and not the rule. The
strict legal framework that governs surveillance can thus be considered
another proof of “the strength of the internal and external legitimacy of the
Belgian democratic system.”133
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